The first publicly known public key memorandum of understanding that meets the above criteria was the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in which two parties together expose a random generator in such a way that a listener cannot determine in a feasible way what is the resulting value used to make a common key. The first successful methods for password-authenticated key agreement were encrypted key exchange methods described in 1992 by Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt. Although some of the early methods were flawed, the surviving and improved forms of EKE effectively reinforce a common password to form a common key that can then be used for message encryption and/or authentication. The first proven PAKE protocols were established by M. Bellare, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway (Eurocrypt 2000) and V. Boyko, P. MacKenzie and S.
Patel (Eurocrypt 2000) under work. These protocols proved safe in what is known as the Random Oracle Model (or even more powerful variants), and the first protocols, which proved safe according to standard assumptions, were those of O. Goldreich and Y. Lindell (Crypto 2001), which serve as proof of plausibility but are not effective, and J. Katz, R. Ostrovsky and M. Yung (Eurocrypt 2001), which is convenient. Authenticated key protocols require the separate setting of a password (which can be smaller than a key) in a way that is both private and integrity. These are designed to withstand man-in-the-middle attacks and other active attacks against the password and established keys. For example, DH-EKE, SPEKE, and SRP are authenticated variations of Diffie-Hellman. A considerable number of alternative and safe PAKE protocols have been implemented by M.
Bellare, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway given, variations and proofs of security have been offered in this growing class of key password-authenticated convention methods. The current standards for these methods are IETF RFC 2945, RFC 5054, RFC 5931, RFC 5998, RFC 6124, RFC 6617, RFC 6628 and RFC 6631, IEEE Std 1363.2-2008, ITU-T X.1035 and ISO-IEC 11770-4:2006. In cryptography, a password-authenticated key agreement method is an interactive method for two or more parties to create cryptographic keys based on the knowledge of one or more parties through a password. The exponential exchange of keys in itself does not provide for prior agreement or subsequent authentication between participants. It has therefore been described as an anonymous key memorandum of understanding. A large number of cryptographic authentication schemes and protocols have been developed to provide key authenticated agreements to prevent man-in-the-middle and related attacks. These methods usually mathematically link the agreed key to other agreed data, such as for example. B the following: the password-certified key agreement usually includes methods such as: In cryptography, a key memorandum of understanding is a protocol in which two or more parties can agree on a key in such a way that both influence the outcome. If properly implemented, it prevents unwanted third parties from imposing an important choice on the parties. Protocols that are useful in practice also do not reveal to any wiretapped party which key has been agreed.
Many key exchange systems allow one party to generate the key and send that key simply to the other party – the other party has no influence on the key. Using a key-agreement protocol avoids some key distribution issues related to these systems. Balanced PAKE allows parties that use the same password to negotiate and authenticate a common key….