The Minsk agreements were first negotiated in a telephone conversation between Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko, and then in The Normandy format between representatives of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France. Subsequently, the trilateral contact group (Ukraine, Russia and THE OSCE) drafted and signed them. With the 2015 Ukrainian municipal elections scheduled for 25 October, DPR leader Alexander Zakhartchenko adopted a decree on 2 July ordering the sending election on 18 October.  He stated that this measure was “in accordance with the Minsk agreements”.  According to Zakharchenko, this meant that the DPR had “started to implement the Minsk agreements independently”.  Zakharchenko stated that the elections would be held “on the basis of The Ukrainian Law on the Status of Temporary Self-Domination of Certain Districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions”, as they were not in contradiction with the DPR Constitution and laws.  In February 2015, the Minsk II agreements were signed by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, Germany and Ukrainian separatists. The aim of the document was to end armed fighting and resolve the conflict between the Ukrainian government and the secessionist oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk. Minsk II formed a series of thirteen steps, including a ceasefire, amnesty, local elections and finally restoring control over the Ukrainian federal level, but with constitutional reform.  This agreement was a continuation of a peace treaty previously attempted in 2014, which had been broken, but Minsk II itself could not hold. This paper examines the reasons why the first two steps of the treaty were not maintained and uses theories of realism and the spoiler problem as lenses to see the conflict. This case study concludes that the lack of consideration of the interests of Russia and America and their ability to play the game are the main reasons for the failure of the agreements. From a legal point of view, the Minsk agreements have become non-adiginous within the Ukrainian legislature.
However, Ukraine has no other peace agreements with Russia and considers these agreements to be legal and binding. These discussions are based on the so-called Minsk agreements, which refer to a protocol and memorandum signed in September 2014, and then to a package of measures in February 2015, approved by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2202 (and sometimes called the Minsk II agreement). All these documents were negotiated in the Belarusian capital (President Lukashenko cleverly proposed to hold these talks, which allowed him to adopt a neutral attitude), supported by the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and signed by representatives of Ukraine and Russia, but also by the self-proclaimed leaders of the “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. Meanwhile, most of the EU sanctions launched since 2014 following Russia`s annexation of Crimea and its involvement in eastern Ukraine are linked to Russia`s “full implementation” of the Minsk agreements.